Superseded, 27 September 2026. This page is the record of Call #4 (6 Aug) as presented, and keeps the figures and vocabulary of that date. In paper v5.2 (27 September 2026): the seven-policyholder cohort earns +$5,306.98 (was $3,126.62); the ten-year renewer is $1,093.62, breaking even in year 2 (was $782.14, year 4); filing / planning basis are now the revenue-neutral / level-effect basis. The current state is on the project hub.
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Cohorts & scenarios: does the loss ratio depend on how long they have renewed?

Call #4 deep dive · Thursday, August 6, 2026 · Phase 4 close-out + tranche-2 bundle · answers the two asks from Call #3 (Jul 16)

0. What you asked for, and what this page answers

“Wouldn’t that affect the loss? … let’s say you have a 10 year person. So over 10 years, they keep renewing … you probably know them very well. You price it well. So there’s less surprises. They’re probably more profitable over time. So the losses might actually differ by how long you have had them renew. … is this a dynamic or are we just saying everything is a static thing and we’re just trying to see who stays?” — Mark Mondello, Call #3 (2026-07-16)
“Even if it’s a very simple case study. You have … a very small cohort of policyholders. Two people renew, five people renew for ten years. … how would this model account for that and what would it show? … it’d be interesting to see how this adds to the lens of how you evaluate that in terms of profit.” — Mark Mondello, Call #3 (2026-07-16)

Both are now built into the toolkit, not just drawn as exhibits. Three findings worth your time, in order of how much they should change your thinking:

Default remains off (loss_trend=0.0, an exact no-op) until you choose a basis. Poll questions Q1–Q3 are exactly these decisions.

1. The unifying formula, and why the old one could not express your question

Through Call #3 every model reported CLV in this form:

CLV = DERT × margin   where DERT = one discounted expected renewal count, margin = P·(1−e) − L, constant in every future year

A margin that varies by year cannot be factored out of a discounted sum, so that form is structurally incapable of carrying a tenure-varying loss ratio. The identity we now use is:

CLV = Σt=1..H  nt × [ P·(1−e) − L·mt + X ]     nt = DERT(t) − DERT(t−1)

The decomposition introduces no new estimation: each year's expected renewals is the difference of the cumulative number the model already reported, so it sums back to DERT(H) exactly (measured error 0.0 on all six families), and when mt ≡ 1 it collapses to the old formula to the cent.

TermMeaningWhere it comes from
ntDiscounted expected renewals occurring in future year t Differenced from each model's own DERT — BG/NBD, Pareto/NBD, Cox PH, Weibull AFT, Markov, hybrid
PAverage annual premium per customerObserved book
eRenewal expense ratio (0.20)Split-expense convention, §2.2 — acquisition is sunk
LCustomer's own average annual lossObserved book (already embeds their realized tenure experience)
mtTenure loss multiplier — the new term Fitted curve, indexed relative to the customer's own current tenure (§2)
XCross-sell + upsell per renewal ($150 + $100) Constrained variant only — firewalled from filing exhibits (NY §2304)
HHorizon (5 years default)Assumption

2. Where the curve comes from — measured, then smoothed

The gradient is not assumed. retention_adjusted_loss_ratio() measures it directly on the book: loss ratio by tenure year, against a pooled 0.5246 and a survival-weighted lifetime 0.5742.

Measured loss ratio by tenure Fitted curve (shipped)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.625 0.416 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 tenure year
Measured loss ratio by tenure (bars) and the shipped fitted curve (line). The tenure-6 bar rising to 0.517 is why we do not price off raw yearly ratios.

Raw yearly ratios are noisy — tenure 6 jumps back to 0.5174 on a thin $7.9M of premium. Pricing off that would be indefensible, so the shipped curve is a premium-weighted log-linear fit:

log(m) = 0.140681 − 0.043096 × tenure   →  4.22% loss-ratio credit per renewal year, weighted R² = 0.887   floored at 0.70

The floor matters: selection wear-off is not unlimited, and an unfloored exponential would eventually price a 25-year customer at an implausibly low loss ratio. This is the actuarial analog of a selected development pattern with a tail cut-off — smooth the observations, then stop extrapolating where credibility runs out.

The indexing subtlety that changes the answer

The multiplier is indexed relative to each customer's own current tenure, mt = curve[τ+t] / curve[τ], not on absolute tenure. This is the crux. A customer's L is their own realized average loss, so it already contains the improvement they have lived through. Multiplying it by an absolute-tenure discount would credit the same improvement twice.

CustomerObserved loss ratioWhat the curve adds
First-year~0.63 The full forward glide toward the mature level, if they persist
Ten-year~0.42 Almost nothing further — their advantage is already in the 0.42

So the honest reading of your point is: tenure value is mostly already in the observed loss; what the curve adds is the expected further improvement for the not-yet-mature.

3. Your cohort, hand-checkable — two renew once, five renew for ten years

Exactly the exhibit you asked for. Persistence is stated, not modelled, so every cell below can be checked with a calculator and no model is involved.

Assumptions (public-benchmark anchored): annual premium $1,450, loss ratio 0.66, renewal expense 0.20, acquisition expense 0.40, discount 8%.

Premium per term$1,450.00
− Loss (1,450 × 0.66)− $957.00
− Renewal expense (1,450 × 0.20)− $290.00
= Margin per renewal term$203.00
Acquisition expense, charged once (1,450 × 0.40)− $580.00
So: how many $203 terms does it take to recover $580?→ four

Year by year, one short renewer beside one ten-year renewer

YearMarginDiscount factor DiscountedCumulative — short Cumulative — lifer
0 (acquisition)−580.001.000000 −580.00−580.00−580.00
1203.000.925926187.96 −392.04−392.04
2203.000.857339174.04 lapsed−218.00
3203.000.793832161.15 —−56.85
4203.000.735030149.21 —+92.36  ← breakeven
5203.000.680583138.16 —+230.52
6203.000.630170127.92 —+358.44
7203.000.583490118.45 —+476.89
8203.000.540269109.67 —+586.56
9203.000.500249101.55 —+688.11
10203.000.46319394.03 −$392.04+$782.14
Renews once, then lapses Renews for ten years
+800 0 −600 +$782  lifer −$392  short renewer breakeven yr 4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 policy year
Cumulative discounted value. Acquisition cost is a hole dug once; only persistence fills it.

The cohort in terms of profit — flat loss ratio

PolicyholderRenewal termsPremium LossExpenseCLV Loss ratio
Short-111,450957 870−392.040.6600
Short-211,450957 870−392.040.6600
Lifer-1 … Lifer-5 (each)10 14,5009,5703,480 +782.140.6600
COHORT TOTAL (7 policyholders)52 75,40049,76419,140 +3,126.620.6600

The profit lens you asked for. Two of seven policyholders destroy value, yet the cohort earns +$3,127. An identical loss ratio of 0.66 on every single policy produces CLVs ranging from −$392 to +$782 — persistence, not loss experience, is doing the work. A book written entirely of one-renewal policyholders at a "profitable" 0.66 loss ratio would lose money.

The same cohort with the tenure credit applied

PolicyholderLoss (flat)Loss (tenure-credited) CLV (flat)CLV (credited)Effective LR
Short-1 / Short-2 (each)957.00 916.59−392.04−354.62 0.6321
Lifer-1 … Lifer-5 (each)9,570.00 7,608.20+782.14+1,959.92 0.5247
COHORT TOTAL49,764.0039,874.18 +3,126.62+9,090.360.5288

The ten-year renewer's loss ratio glides 0.6321 → 0.4289 across the ten terms, and their value more than doubles ($782 → $1,960). Cohort value rises +190.7%.

This is the number to argue about. A +190.7% swing from one assumption is not a rounding detail — it is leverage. The margin is $203 on $1,450 of premium, so a 20% cut in loss adds ~$191 to a $203 margin. Whether this belongs in a filed indication, in planning only, or nowhere, is a POG decision — that is poll Q1 and Q3.

Reproduce: python docs/calls/phase4_cohort_scenario_data.py §B · cas_clv.cohorts.mark_cohort(), micro_cohort_walkthrough()

4. Scaling up — the same question on the whole book

You said: "then you can extrapolate that." Here is the extrapolation on 5,000 synthetic customers, 32,728 policy terms, valued on the hybrid headline model at a 5-year horizon.

Mean CLV by tenure cohort P25–P75 band
$0 $3k $6k $9k $12k 1 yr (919) $1,871 2–3 yrs (1,350) $1,571 4–5 yrs (943) $3,112 6–9 yrs (1,268) $5,275 10+ yrs (520) $7,707
Mean CLV by tenure cohort with the P25–P75 band. The bands overlap heavily — which is exactly why we quote cohorts, not points.
Tenure cohortCustomersMean CLV P25MedianP75 Loss ratioShare of value
1 yr9191,870.71146.36 630.094,649.520.64689.8%
2–3 yrs1,3501,570.730.00 0.004,504.360.603412.1%
4–5 yrs9433,111.950.00 2,318.815,855.880.559316.8%
6–9 yrs1,2685,275.141,126.73 4,852.238,993.790.529038.3%
10+ yrs5207,706.532,869.66 5,791.4011,688.080.456422.9%

The direct answer to your question: mean CLV rises 4.1× (from $1,871 to $7,707) while the loss ratio falls 0.647 → 0.456. The 10+ cohort is 10.4% of customers but 22.9% of book value.

Two honest caveats visible in the table. The 2–3 year cohort's mean is below the 1-year cohort's — early lapses concentrate there, and its P25 and median are both $0.00 (lapsed customers carry zero residual value). And the bands are enormous relative to the means: the 1-year cohort spans $146–$4,650. A single customer's CLV is not a quotable number; a cohort with its band is.

Where each cohort's value comes from — the profit bridge

CohortPremium PVLoss PV Expense PVCross-sell PVCLV PV − AcquisitionNet of acquisition
1 yr4,777,782−2,439,652 −955,557336,6101,719,184 −1,241,583477,601
2–3 yrs7,854,853−4,711,201 −1,570,971547,8102,120,492 −1,873,437247,054
4–5 yrs9,302,226−5,079,461 −1,860,445572,2492,934,568 −1,482,4151,452,153
6–9 yrs20,430,762−10,750,928 −4,086,1521,095,2026,688,883 −2,341,0044,347,880
10+ yrs10,182,886−4,623,002 −2,036,577484,0904,007,397 −1,088,3072,919,089

Net of acquisition cost, the 1-year cohort retains only $477.6K of $1.72M of gross value (28%), while the 10+ cohort keeps $2.92M of $4.01M (73%). The 2–3 year cohort is the thinnest of all at $247K net on $2.12M gross (12%) — it has paid the acquisition cost but not yet earned it back. That trough is where retention spend has the highest return.

Reproduce: §C of the companion script · cohort_clv_summary(), cohort_profit_bridge()

5. The finding that inverts the intuition READ THIS ONE

If the tenure credit is applied on a revenue-neutral filing basis — rescaled so total expected book loss is unchanged, which is what makes it a relativity rather than a rate decrease — then value moves between cohorts and the book total does not move at all ($17,470,511 either way, neutral by construction).

And the direction is the opposite of a loyalty discount:

Mean CLV increases Mean CLV decreases
$0 −$400 −$600 +$125 1 yr +$49  (+2.6%) 2–3 yrs +$53  (+3.4%) 4–5 yrs +$98  (+3.1%) 6–9 yrs +$57  (+1.1%) 10+ yrs −$541  (−7.0%)
Change in mean CLV per cohort on the revenue-neutral filing basis. The book total is unchanged; the long-tenured cohort funds the gains of the younger ones.

Why. Relative indexing means the improvement still ahead is what gets credited. Long-tenured customers have almost none left (they are at the curve floor); newer customers have plenty. Rescaling to revenue-neutrality then lifts everyone's multiplier to restore the book total — which, for the cohort with no forward improvement to offset it, means their loss goes up relative to flat.

Implication for filing. "Recognise that loss ratio improves with tenure" and "give long-tenured policyholders a discount" are not the same proposition. On a revenue-neutral basis the first implies the second's opposite. Any tenure-based relativity built naively from a loss-ratio-by-tenure exhibit is likely to be backwards.

The two bases and what each is for:

BasisWhat it assumesBook CLVUse for
Filing
tenure_loss_normalize=True (default)
The gradient is a relativity: same total loss, distributed by tenure $17.47M
unchanged
Rate relativities, filing exhibits. rate_adequacy_check unaffected by construction.
Planning
tenure_loss_normalize=False
The gradient is real and forward-looking: the maturing book's loss genuinely falls $20.09M
+$2.62M
Acquisition budgets, retention-spend ROI, planning. Must not enter an unfiled indication.

On the planning basis the entire uplift is exactly the modelled loss saving: expected discounted loss falls $27.60M → $24.99M (−$2.62M) and book CLV rises by the same $2.62M. Nothing else moves — that identity is asserted in the test suite.

Reproduce: §D of the companion script · diagnostics: decomposition error 0.0, negative increments clamped 0, loss-weighted mean multiplier 1.000000, mean effective LR year 1 0.6151 → final 0.5307.

6. Scenario planning — the levers, and which ones actually matter

Also from Call #3: "it won't be a static model which will give you one number and that's it. It's more about you have a few levers to change and basis those changes, you can see how this value will evolve." Seven named scenarios now ship, and there is a live planner where you can move the levers yourself.

ScenarioWhat it assumesBook CLV vs base
baseModel as configured17,470,5111.00
soft_marketPrice competition: weaker margins, retention supported by price 17,555,6641.00
tenure_loss_creditFull measured tenure gradient (filing basis) 17,470,5111.00
hard_marketRate hardening: better margins, more shopping, weaker retention 15,013,7530.86
adverse_retentionBook-wide 15% deterioration in retention 12,391,5670.71
recessionLapse pressure + expense stress + no cross-sell 8,001,8960.46
long_horizonTen-year valuation view 28,750,9721.65

The result worth flagging: persistence dominates everything else. The soft market — worse margins and worse expenses — comes out marginally ahead of base, because its +3% retention outweighs the margin loss. Meanwhile the hard market's better margins cannot offset an 8% retention decline. CLV is far more sensitive to how long customers stay than to what you earn per year while they do. This is asserted in the test suite so it cannot regress silently.

Is scenario impact real, or model-choice artifact?

Reading across model families at fixed scenario answers the question you would reasonably ask next — whether these movements survive changing the model.

ScenarioBG/NBDPareto/NBD Cox PHWeibull AFTMarkov HybridMax/min spread
base17.49M16.97M 17.49M16.29M15.64M 17.47M1.118
soft_market17.49M17.02M 17.55M16.33M15.69M 17.56M1.119
hard_market15.07M14.60M 15.04M14.01M13.45M 15.01M1.120
adverse_retention12.41M12.04M 12.41M11.55M11.10M 12.39M1.118
recession7.53M7.54M 7.92M7.39M7.08M 8.00M1.131

Model choice contributes a stable ~12% spread, and it does not interact with the scenario (1.118 → 1.131 across all five). Scenario effects — up to −54% for recession — are several times larger. Practically: getting the assumptions right matters far more than getting the model right, and all six families agree on the direction of every scenario. That is the strongest argument we have for the transparent, defensible model at filing.

Reproduce: §E of the companion script · cas_clv.scenarios.run_scenarios(), scenario_comparison() · full grid: docs/sensitivity_appendix.md

7. How we judge it — and what would falsify it

NO-OP GUARANTEE analog: a rate change that files at 0.0%

Every previously published figure is unchanged. loss_trend=0.0 is the default and reproduces the flat result to the cent on all six model families — asserted, not asserted loosely: pd.testing.assert_frame_equal on the whole prediction frame.

DECOMPOSITION EXACTNESS analog: incremental development factors must chain to the cumulative

Σt nt = DERT(H) with maximum absolute error 0.0 across all six families. Zero negative increments needed clamping on this book, though the guard remains because the hybrid and Markov engines are not guaranteed monotone in horizon.

REVENUE NEUTRALITY analog: an off-balance rebalance to a 1.000 overall factor

Loss-weighted mean multiplier = 1.000000 on the filing basis, so total expected discounted loss is preserved exactly and rate_adequacy_check is untouched.

CURVE CREDIBILITY analog: selected vs observed development, with a tail cut-off

Premium-weighted R² = 0.887 against the observed multipliers. The floor at 0.70 stops extrapolation where credibility runs out. What would falsify it: if the fitted gradient does not reproduce across carriers and periods, the curve is book-specific and must be a user input rather than a shipped default — which is exactly what the NAIC five-year reproducibility test (§8) is for, and why we are asking you to choose the curve source (Q2).

DISPARATE IMPACT analog: four-fifths rule screen

Tenure is not a protected class, but a tenure relativity can proxy for one (age correlates with tenure). disparate_impact_test continues to pass on every region cohort with a minimum adverse-impact ratio of 0.98 against the 0.80 threshold. We would want this re-run on age bands before any filing use — flagged as an open item, not claimed as clear.

8. Open, and honestly not done

9. Glossary — every symbol and abbreviation on this page

TermMeaning
CLVCustomer lifetime value — discounted expected future profit from a customer.
DERTDiscounted expected residual transactions: expected future renewals, discounted, for a customer who is currently in force.
ntDiscounted expected renewals occurring specifically in future year t (the per-year decomposition).
mtTenure loss multiplier applied to the customer's own loss in future year t.
τ (tau)The customer's attained tenure — policy years already completed at the valuation date.
loss_trendBlend weight, 0.0 (flat loss ratio) to 1.0 (full fitted curve). Default 0.0.
Filing basisTenure curve rescaled to be revenue-neutral — a relativity. tenure_loss_normalize=True.
Planning basisTenure curve applied at its own level — a genuine level change. tenure_loss_normalize=False.
Unconstrained CLVPremium − loss − expense only. The filing-defensible base (cross-sell term = 0).
Constrained CLVUnconstrained + cross-sell + upsell. Business-planning view; excluded from indications (NY §2304).
Net of acquisitionConstrained CLV minus the one-off acquisition expense — the inception / new-business view.
Residual CLVValue of an in-force customer going forward; acquisition cost is sunk and not re-charged.
P25 / P7525th and 75th percentile of CLV within a cohort — the interquartile band.
Loss ratioIncurred loss ÷ earned premium.
Pooled loss ratioBook-wide loss ÷ book-wide premium, ignoring tenure (0.5246 here).
Lifetime loss ratioLoss ratio weighted by expected survival to each tenure year (0.5742 here).
BG/NBDBeta-Geometric / Negative Binomial Distribution — probabilistic buy-till-you-die renewal model (Fader–Hardie–Lee 2005).
Pareto/NBDThe original buy-till-you-die benchmark (Schmittlein–Morrison–Colombo 1987).
Cox PHCox proportional hazards survival model of time-to-lapse.
Weibull AFTWeibull accelerated failure time survival model.
Markov / HMMMulti-state model over product-portfolio states; HMM uses latent (decoded) states.
HybridBG/NBD supplies the probabilistic per-year base; gradient boosting learns only the residual. The POG-selected headline.
R²Share of variance explained — here, premium-weighted, of the fitted curve against observed multipliers.
MAEMean absolute error.
Four-fifths ruleAdverse-impact screen: a group's favourable-outcome rate below 0.80× the reference group's is flagged.
NAICNational Association of Insurance Commissioners.
NY §2304New York rate-regulation provision constraining price optimization.
POGProject Oversight Group — this committee.

10. Reproducibility & provenance

Every figure on this page is generated, not transcribed. Regenerate all of them with:

python docs/calls/phase4_cohort_scenario_data.py

Companion materials: call brief · decision poll · interactive scenario planner · Jul-16 case studies

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This research project has been funded by the Casualty Actuarial Society.